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1. Some Preliminary Clarification on the Concept Examined and the Scope of the 
Article 
 
It is often said that, as in other civil law systems, precedents in the Italian legal system 
are not legally binding, as they are simply persuasive (in other words, they affect the legal 
reasoning of judgments only de facto)
2
.  
For this reason, at a first glance, this topic would not deserve much attention by lawyers. 
However, it does, at least for three reasons.  
First, precedent, although not legally binding, affects de facto the legal reasoning 
underpinning judgments. This is the main reason why it is worth studying their role: the 
way the Italian courts carry out their every-day legal reasoning is affected (even if only de 
facto) by precedents.  
Secondly, it is worth studying the specific dimensions in the light of which precedents 
affect the legal reasoning of the courts in the Italian system, in order to understand how 
persuasive the precedent actually is there. 
As Michele Taruffo has shown in his studies
3
, beyond the traditional dichotomy (legally 
binding precedent in common law system/persuasive precedent in civil law systems), in 
                                                          
2
 See A. ANZON, Il valore del precedente nel giudizio sulle leggi. L’esperienza italiana alla luce di un’analisi 
comparata sul regime del richterrecht, Milano, 1995, p. 15 and A. PIZZORUSSO, Stare decisis e Corte 
costituzionale, in R. Treves (ed.), La dottrina del precedente nella giurisprudenza della Corte costituzionale, 
Torino, 1971, p. 53 f.  
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both the common law system and the civil law system, the actual role of precedent in a 
jurisdiction depends on some specific dimensions, such as:  
- an ‘institutional dimension’, i.e. the existence of more than one Supreme Court (like 
the Italian Corte di Cassazione and Consiglio di Stato) and/or the existence of a 
Constitutional Court (not in a hierarchical relation with the other courts) in the jurisdiction 
concerned
4
. The higher the quantity of Supreme Courts established in a jurisdiction, the 
higher the quantity of sources of potentially opposing precedents coexists there.  
- an ‘objective dimension’, i.e. the way in which the precedent is framed (with regard to 
the ratio decidendi or to the regula juris, as will be explained later), the way in which the 
precedent is published (by reporting or by the massimazione, as will be seen later)
5
 and the 
overall number of judgments issued by the Supreme Court (the more numerous the 




- a ‘structural dimension’, i.e. the way in which the precedent is identified as such
7
. One 
should bear in mind that strictly speaking what creates a precedent in the common law is 
the ratio decidendi of one previous decision
8
. In the Italian legal system, the thing which is 
persuasive and affects legal reasoning is not the ratio decidendi of one previous decision, 
but the giurisprudenza costante, which is a group of past judgments with the same 
constant underpinning regula juris. Clearly, the higher the quantity of judgments required 
to make a precedent, the higher the risk is of contradictory judgments and the higher the 
difficulty there is to work out when a case counts as a precedent.  
- an ‘effectiveness dimension’, i.e. the degree of the binding force of the precedent, 
which can vary within common law jurisdictions too
9
.  
                                                                                                                                                                                
3
 See M. TARUFFO, Dimensioni del precedente giudiziario, in Riv. Trim. Dir. Proc. Civ., 1994, p. 413 ff. See 
now also A. PIZZORUSSO, Delle fonti del diritto. Disposizioni sulla legge in generale. Art. 1-9, in F. Galgano 
(ed.), Commentario del codice civile Scialoja-Branca, Bologna-Roma, Seconda edizione, 2011, p. 709 ff. and 
724 ff. 
4
 See M. TARUFFO, Dimensioni del precedente giudiziario, cit., p. 416 ff. and also ID., Aspetti del precedente 
giudiziale, in Criminalia, 2014, p. 44 ff.  
5
 See M. TARUFFO, Dimensioni del precedente giudiziario, cit., p. 421 ff. and also ID., Precedente e 
giurisprudenza, in Riv. Trim. Dir. Proc. Civ., 2007, p. 712 ff.  
6
 See M. TARUFFO, La Corte di cassazione tra legittimità e merito, in Foro It., 1988, V-13, p. 237 ff. and ID., 
Precedente e giurisprudenza, cit., p. 713 ff. 
7
 See M. TARUFFO, Dimensioni del precedente giudiziario, cit., p. 423 ff. and also ID., Precedente e 
giurisprudenza, cit., p. 711 ff. 
8
 See M. TARUFFO, Aspetti del precedente giudiziale, cit., p. 39 ff.  
9
 See M. TARUFFO, Dimensioni del precedente giudiziario, cit., p. 426 ff.  
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It will be seen later how these dimensions are characterized in the Italian legal system 
and how they affect the role of the precedent there.   
Thirdly, some distinguished Italian academics stated that precedents in Italian system 
played a legal role, i.e. their force derives from legal provisions or principles of law
10
.  
Their opinion is not shared by the rest of the academia
11
. However, some pieces of 
legislation and some cases have recently expressly recognised the role of precedents at 
least with regards to some specific circumstances. These pieces of legislation and cases 
will be described here.  
All that said, one of the aims of the article is examining whether such express 
recognitions of the role of the precedent are effective in the light of the dimensions 
mentioned above. In other words, one of the purposes of this article is in analysing, in the 
light of the dimensions mentioned above, how effective precedent is in the Italian legal 
system, under legislation and case-law which expressly recognise the role of the precedent. 
Actually, as the use of precedent made by the Corte di cassazione has already been 
studied in depth (especially by Michele Taruffo), the main scope of the article, after 
describing Taruffo’s analysis
12
, will be analysing the use of precedent made by the Italian 
Constitutional Court. On the one hand, the approach of the Corte costituzionale towards its 
own decisions will be examined, in order to test its effectiveness in the Italian legal order 
in the light of the dimensions set by Taruffo
13
; on the other hand, the role of precedent of 
two other courts (the Corte di cassazione and the European Court of Human Rights), as 
used by the Corte costituzionale itself in its jurisprudence will be examined, so as to see 




So as to understand better the actual role played by precedent in the Italian legal system, 





2. The Tasks of the Italian Supreme Court and of the Italian Constitutional Court 
                                                          
10
 See G. GORLA, voce Precedente giudiziario, in Enc. giur., 1990, vol. XXIII, p. 4 ff. e A. PIZZORUSSO, 
Delle fonti del diritto, cit., p. 717 ff. 
11
 See among others A. ANZON, Il valore del precedente nel giudizio sulle leggi, cit., p. 86 ff.  
12
 See paragraph 3.  
13
 See paragraph 4.1.  
14
 See paragraph 4.2 and 4.3. 
15
 See paragraph 2.  
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2.1. The Corte di cassazione 
 
In English when we speak of ‘the Judiciary’ or ‘judicial power’ (in Italian: potere 
giudiziario), we refer to the entire system of the courts that interpret and apply the law. 
This name is usually used from the perspective of the separation of powers.  
The Italian Judiciary is composed of ordinary judicial bodies (Judiciary in a narrow 
sense) and special judicial bodies. Ordinary judicial bodies are civil and criminal courts, 
such as Tribunals and Courts of Appeal (Tribunali and Corti d’appello), and the Supreme 
Court of Cassation (Corte di cassazione). Special judicial bodies are the Council of State 
(which is tasked with administrative justice), the Court of Auditors (which is tasked with 
justice in matters of public accounts) and military tribunals (which are tasked with military 
justice).  
The Corte di cassazione is a giudice di legittimità (in other words it scrutinises whether 
the judgments of the lower courts have been issued in compliance with legislation) and not 
a giudice di merito like the lower courts, which decide on the merits of each case.  
When a judgment of a lower court is in violation of the law, the Court of Cassation can 
declare it void (cassare). The Court of Cassation is not allowed to decide itself on the 
merits of the case. The annulment can be of two kinds: without a referral to (senza rinvio) 
or with a referral to the lower court (con rinvio). The annulment without a referral is issued 
when the lower court was not responsible for issuing that judgment; whereas the 
annulment with a referral is issued when the lower court was responsible for issuing that 
judgment but it did so in violation of the law. In the latter, the proceedings can be started 
again before the lower court which must avoid violating the law again.  
The French Cour de cassation provided the model for the Corte di cassazione. Under 
Article 65 of the Regio decreto 30 gennaio 1941, n. 12, the Italian Corte di cassazione 
assures the correct observance and the uniform interpretation of the law, the unity of the 
legal order, the respect of the boundaries of different jurisdictions.   
This task is carried out by the Court of Cassation because, as I mentioned, it is the 
Supreme Court before which decisions of the ordinary and special courts are referred to for 
any violation of the law. Under Article 111 of the Italian Constitution, decisions and 
measures affecting personal freedom issued by ordinary and special courts can be appealed 
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to the Court of Cassation in cases of violation of the law. Appeals to the Court of Cassation 
against decisions of the Council of State and the Courts of Auditors are permitted only for 
reasons of jurisdiction. Clearly, the Corte di cassazione can assure a uniform interpretation 
of domestic law by scrutinising any violation of the law made by ordinary and special 
courts.  
In theory, the task of a Court of Cassation does not directly safeguard the rights of the 
claimant or the defendant in case law (this is the task of the Tribunals and of the Courts of 
Appeal). It gives a uniform interpretation of domestic law. In other words, the Court of 
Cassation’s tasks in theory should not seek to grant a fair judgment for the claimant or the 
defendant but to assure the uniformity of judgments (or better, the uniformity of the 
interpretation of the law) within the legal order.  
Piero Calamandrei, one of the most distinguished Italian legal scholars in the first half 
of the Twentieth century, was the main supporter of such a ‘pure’ model. The task of the 
Court of Cassation, he wrote, cannot be contaminated and distracted by matters which 
concern the only interests of the claimant and the defendant. Instead of giving a fair 
solution to the concrete case, according to Calamandrei, the Corte di cassazione should 
suggest for the future the theoretical interpretation of the law which fits best with the 
legislature’s will. This is why, he stated that the Corte di cassazione should focus on 
framing the general principles of its judgments
16
.  
However, the role played by the Corte di cassazione deviated from the ‘pure’ model in 
the following years.  
First, the extent of the area of ‘violations of the law’ goes beyond the violation of 
substantive law and involves the violation of procedural law too. Clearly, this has led the 
Corte di cassazione to focusing on matters concerning the proceedings regarding concrete 
cases (in other words directly safeguarding the rights of the claimant and the defendant) 
instead of focusing mainly on matters concerning the abstract interpretation of the law (in 
other words giving a uniform interpretation of substantive law)
17
.  
In particular, under Article 360 of the 1940 Code of the civil courts (Codice di 
procedura civile) judgments can be appealed to the Court of Cassation on grounds which 
seem to go beyond the violation of substantial laws: No. 1) issues concerning the 
                                                          
16
 See P. CALAMANDREI, Per il funzionamento della Cassazione unica (1924), now in ID., Opere giuridiche, 
Napoli, 1979, vol. VIII, p. 387.  
17
 See M. TARUFFO, La Corte di cassazione tra legittimità e merito, cit., p. 239 ff.  
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responsibilities of the court; No. 2) issues concerning the competence of the court; No. 4) 
issues concerning the validity of the judgment; No. 5) issues concerning the legal 
reasoning underpinning the judgment. Only No. 3) seems to reflect the ‘pure’ model: 
issues concerning the violation of substantive laws.  
Secondly, the Corte di cassazione interpreted in a very broad way the word ‘decisions’ 
that can be challenged before it. Every act of a lower court that has an impact on a 
claimant’s or defendant’s rights, can be challenged before it; not only the main judgments 
which conclude the proceedings. Once again, this has led to the Corte di cassazione to 
focus on minor issues and not only on abstract interpretation of the law
18
.  
At the end of the day, instead of issuing a judgment which looks at the future (in other 
words with general principles to be applied in future cases), the Corte di cassazione looks 
at the past (in other words by establishing a principle that must be used by the lower court 
to solve the concrete contestation)
19
.  
Finally, for the aim of this analysis, it is worth mentioning how the Corte di cassazione 
is structured and works.  
The Corte di cassazione is composed of thirteen chambers: six civil chambers, seven 
criminal chambers. The First president of the Court of Cassation may state that a case is to 
be decided by united chambers when the same legal issues have been previously decided 
by two or more different chambers in a different way one from another or when the issue is 
of a relevant nature.  
 
2.2. The Corte costituzionale 
 
The task of the Corte costituzionale is to carry out constitutional judicial review.  
In Italy constitutional judicial review is carried out by a single and specialized Court 
(centralized scrutiny), the Corte costituzionale
20
.  
The Corte costituzionale is composed of fifteen judges: one third is appointed by the 
President of the Republic; one third is elected by the Parliament in joint sitting; one third is 
elected by the ordinary and administrative supreme Courts (Section 135, subsection 1, 




 Ibidem.  
20
 On the Italian Corte costituzionale, see V. BARSOTTI-P.G. CAROZZA-M. CARTABIA-A. SIMONCINI (eds.), 
Italian Constitutional Justice in Global Context, Oxford, 2015.  
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Italian Constitution). This complex way of appointing/electing constitutional Judges is of 
great value because it makes the Corte costituzionale a neutral and non-partisan body, 
which reflects the many opinions which are in our society.  
Constitutional Judges shall be chosen from Judges, including those retired, of the 
ordinary and administrative higher Courts, from full university professors of law and 
lawyers with at least twenty years of practice (Article 135, subsection 2, of the 
Constitution). This is also important because it allows the Corte costituzionale to be 
composed of experts in law.  
The Corte costituzionale (Article 134, of the Constitution) is manly tasked with judging 
on constitutional legitimacy of Acts of Parliament and decrees issued by the State and laws 
enacted by the Regioni. 
A case can be brought before the Corte costituzionale in two ways, giving rise to either 
a concrete or abstract constitutional judicial review.  
When a Court believes that a piece of primary legislation, which has to be applied to a 
specific case, is not consistent with the Constitution, the Court may challenge this piece of 
legislation before the Corte costituzionale. This is the case of a giudizio di legittimità in via 
incidentale: a concrete review, that is to say that the review carried out by the Corte 
costituzionale arises from a specific and concrete case brought before a Court.  
A regional piece of primary legislation can be challenged before the Corte 
costituzionale also by the State and a State primary piece of legislation can be challenged 
by a Regione because they believe that their own constitutional powers have been 
compromised by this piece of legislation. In this case the review carried out by the Corte 
costituzionale is called giudizio di legittimità in via principale. It is an abstract review, that 
is to say that it does not arise from a concrete case brought before a Court.  
In the light of the current analysis of the role of the precedent in the Italian legal system, 
it is also important to bear in mind that the judgments of the Corte costituzionale are based 
on: 
- the oggetto: the object whose validity is scrutinized by the Court (e.g. Acts of 
Parliament and decrees issued by the State, laws enacted by the Regioni, etc.);  
- the parametro: the standard in the light of which the scrutiny is carried out by the 
Court (e.g. the Constitution, the supreme values, etc.);  
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- the motivi: other legal or non legal factors which influence the judgments (e.g. the 
tertium comparationis which is used when the scrutiny on the respect of the principle of 
equality is carried out).  
 
3. The Analysis of the Precedent in the Italian Legal System Carried Out by Michele 
Taruffo 
 
3.1. The Features of the Precedent in the Italian Legal System 
 
It is now time to focus on the features of precedent in the Italian system. 
Before doing this, it is worth reminding ourselves the main features of precedent in the 
common law system. 
First, the concept of precedent in the common law system is one of the sources of the 
law, beside the statutes
21
.  
Secondly, as already mentioned, a single decision of a court on a matter of law can be 
taken into account as a precedent.  
Thirdly, not every legal observation which is stated by a court can be taken into account 
as a precedent. Only the ratio decidendi (literally: the rationale behind the decision) creates 
a precedent. Other legal propositions in a judgment are considered merely as obiter dicta 
(literally: incidental statements).  
The ratio decidendi is the proposition of law concerning the material facts of the case, 
on which implicitly or expressly the court has framed their judgment. The ratio decidendi 
is not something abstract: it is the rule concerning the material facts concerning the 
concrete case.  
Therefore, when a judgment has been issued, any subsequent court will frame the 
precedent with regards to the material facts of the previous case and will apply it to their 
own judgment only if those material facts do not have any reasonable legal distinction
22
.  
Fourthly, when it is said that the precedent is legally binding (i.e. the rule of the stare 
decisis), this means that any subsequent court must apply the ratio decidendi underpinning 
                                                          
21
 See R. CROSS, Precedent in English Law, Oxford, 1977, p. 153 ff. and in Italian G. CRISCUOLI, 
Introduzione allo studio del diritto inglese. Le fonti, Milano, 2014, p. 44. 
22
 See C.K. ALLEN, Law in the Making, Oxford, 1964, p. 259 ff. and in Italian G. CRISCUOLI, Introduzione 
allo studio del diritto inglese, cit., p. 330 ff.  
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the previous judgment, unless there is a reasonable legal distinction between the two cases. 




When any subsequent court states that a reasonable legal distinction occurs in the case 
brought before them, this is the case of a distinction made by the court: strictly speaking 
this is not an exception to the rule of the stare decisis as there is no analogy between those 
two cases. However, the rule clearly affects the legal reasoning of any subsequent court 
anyway, as the court must explain why those two cases are different from one another.  
The only exception to the rule of the stare decisis is an overruling, that is when a court 
does not follow a precedent (in other words it does not apply a previous ratio decidendi 
notwithstanding the analogy between the two controversies). Only Supreme Courts can 
depart from precedents made by lower courts. Lower courts cannot overrule precedents 
made by Supreme Courts. In some cases Supreme Courts can overrule their own 
precedents: for example, the British Lord Chancellor stated in 1966 that the House of 
Lords (nowadays the UK Supreme Court) would deviate from their precedents, when it 
would appear right to do so
24
.   
All that said, it is now time to explain the features of the precedent in the Italian legal 
system.   
First, precedents in the civil law system are not considered to be sources of the law. 
Sources of the law are only: Constitution; Acts of Parliament; some decrees of the 




Secondly, as already mentioned, what affects legal reasoning is the giurisprudenza 
costante, which is not one precedent but it is a group of past judgments with the same 
constant underpinning ratio decidendi
26
.  
                                                          
23
 On the doctrine of precedent also as an institutional form of public reason that operates in a democratic 
context see A. GEARY-W. MORRISON-R. JAGO (eds.), The Politics of the Common Law: Perspectives, Rights, 
Processes, Institutions, Second edition, 2013, p. 114 ff.  
24
 Practice Statement [1966] 3 All ER 77. On the Practice Statement and the recent cases in which the UK 
Supreme Court has referred to it (as it now forms part of the Court’s Practice Directions), see J. LEE, Fides et 
Ratio: Precedent in the Early Jurisprudence of the United Kingdom Supreme Court, in European Journal of 
Current Legal Studies, 2015, 21 (1).  
25
 See A. ANZON, Il valore del precedente nel giudizio sulle leggi, cit., p. 115 ff. Contra A. PIZZORUSSO, 
Delle fonti del diritto, cit., p. 723 ff.  
26
 See M. TARUFFO, Aspetti del precedente giudiziale, cit., p. 39 ff.  
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Thirdly, it is not entirely correct to speak of ratio decidendi itself in our system as it is 
hard to identify a ratio decidendi in past judgments, in the sense this concept is used in the 
common law world (where, as said, the ratio decidendi is the proposition of law 
concerning the material facts of the concrete case, on which implicitly or expressly the 
court has framed their judgment). In the Italian system, the precedent is made by the 
abstract proposition of law which can be extracted from a group of past judgments. I 
would call it regula juris, instead of ratio decidendi.  
Therefore, any subsequent courts will base their decisions on the abstract proposition of 
law extracted from the giurisprudenza only when they successfully argue that the material 
facts concerning the case brought before it, can be regulated by that same abstract 
proposition of law.  
At the end of the day, in the common law system such a court compares material facts 
and applies the precedent to the controversy before itself only if those material facts do not 
have any reasonable legal distinction; whereas in the civil law system any subsequent 
courts follow the giurisprudenza only when they argue that the material facts can be 




Fourthly, as already said, the giurisprudenza is not legally binding. The giurisprudenza 
of domestic court is simply persuasive. It affects the legal reasoning governing subsequent 
judgments (i.e. when the subsequent court decides to deviate from the giurisprudenza, it 
has to explain in depth the reasons why it does so) but only de facto
28
.  
As the Italian Court of Cassation stated in 2014
29
 the safeguarding of the unity and the 
stability of the interpretation of the law (especially the one given by the Court of Cassation 
and by the united chambers in it) is to be considered ‘alla stregua di un criterio legale di 
interpretazione delle norme giuridiche’ (i.e. a legal criterion of interpretation), especially 
after the amendment of article 374 c.p.c. in 2006 and of art. 360-bis c.p.c. in 2009 (which 
will be examined later). This is not the only nor the main legal criterion but surely it is a 
criterion of much importance. Therefore, the subsequent courts can derogate to it only if 
there are ‘buone ragioni’ (i.e. good reasons) to do this.  
                                                          
27
 Ibidem.  
28
 See A. ANZON, Il valore del precedente nel giudizio sulle leggi, cit., p. 75 ff.  
29
 See Cass. civ., sez. un., 6 novembre 2014, n. 23675.  
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In the same judgment the Court of Cassation also underlined that the courts play an 
important role in making the law flexible in a legal order. However, this could be 
problematic in the light of the unity and the stability of the interpretation of the law when a 
lower court overrules a precedent (literally, in Italian: ‘precedente’) of the Court of 
Cassation. This is even more problematic when the precedent is recent. Therefore, lower 
courts should act responsibly in interpreting the law. This does not mean that courts should 
avoid overruling or should only overrule for the future. This means that courts have to look 
carefully to ensure that there are good reasons to overrule. There is no mathematical 
formula for this. It is a matter of responsibility.  
As the Court of Cassation stated in 2015, in our system the rule of the stare decisis does 









3.2. How Persuasive is the precedent in the Italian legal system? 
 
At the end of the day, in both common law and civil law jurisdictions, precedents affect 
the legal reasoning behind any subsequent judgments, as in both systems the subsequent 
court has to explain why it deviates from the precedent. As already seen, following 
Michele Taruffo’s analysis, beside the dichotomy between legally binding/persuasive 
precedents, the actual role of the precedent in each legal system depends on the role played 
by the aforementioned dimensions. 
All that said, it is now worth analysing how persuasive precedent is in the Italian system 
in the light of the first three dimensions pointed out by Taruffo. The fourth dimension 
(which concerns the degree of the binding force of precedents) seems to be a sort of 
general key which summarises the nature of precedents in the common law and civil law 
jurisdictions.  
(i) The first dimension to be analysed is the institutional one.  
                                                          
30
 See Cass. civ., sez. VI, 9 gennaio 2015, n. 174.  
31
 See M. TARUFFO, Aspetti del precedente giudiziale, cit., p. 41.  
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As already seen, it concerns the relations between courts. From this perspective, there 
are vertical precedents and horizontal precedents. Vertical precedents are those which 
come from Supreme Courts, such as the Corte di cassazione. On the other hand, Taruffo 
speaks of horizontal precedents when a court follows its own precedents.  
According to Taruffo, the effectiveness of vertical and horizontal precedents of the 
Italian Court of Cassation is rather weak, though. The role of the Corte di cassazione is not 
that of the ‘pure’ model (i.e. a court which gives a uniform interpretation of domestic law): 
the Italian Court of Cassation nowadays is tasked with directly safeguarding the rights of 
the claimant or the defendant in case law. This means that the Corte di cassazione does not 
focus only on giving a uniform interpretation of substantive law but also on provisions 
concerning proceedings before the courts. This has led the Corte di cassazione to focus on 
concrete matters instead of general principles
32
. As already said, such a framework leads to 
weak precedents.  
(ii) Secondly, there is an objective dimension: it concerns the boundaries of what 
constitutes a precedent.  
As said, in the common law system the ratio decidendi (the proposition of law 
concerning the material facts of the controversy) constitutes the precedent. In the Italian 
system we tend to refer to the regula juris which can be extracted from the giurisprudenza 
(the abstract proposition of law which can be extracted from a group of past judgments). 
This is perhaps a consequence of the different way Judges are used to dealing with cases in 
the two systems: on the one hand, Judges in civil law systems are used to dealing with 
abstract and general statutory provisions to apply to material facts; on the other hand, 
Judges in the common law system are used to dealing with material facts to be solved via 
propositions of case law concerning material facts.  
However, as far as Italy is concerned, it is worth mentioning two elements which makes 
the effectiveness of the precedents of the Court of Cassation rather weak.  
First, the quantity of the judgments issued by the Corte di cassazione is tremendously 
high. The Supreme Court in the UK issues around 75 judgments per year; the Supreme 
Court of the United States of America issues less than 200 judgments per year; the Italian 
Court of Cassation issues around 50,000 judgments per year.  
                                                          
32
 See M. TARUFFO, La Corte di cassazione tra legittimità e merito, cit., p. 239 ff.  
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Clear precedents can easily be identified when judgments are few. On the other hand, it 
is not easy to frame precedents from amongst thousands of often contradictory judgments 
as those of the Corte di cassazione
33
.  
Secondly, in Italy the abstract propositions of law (massime) are extracted from every 
single judgment of the Corte di cassazione by the Ufficio del Massimario della Corte di 
cassazione which is the office of the Corte di cassazione composed of nine Judges of the 
Court of Cassation which is tasked with extracting the massime from the judgments.  
This system leads to the creation of a paradox. Massime are extracted from all the 
judgments of the Court of Cassation as such, regardless of their value or not as precedents. 




(iii) Thirdly, the structural dimension concerns the number of judgments needed to have 
a precedent. As already said, in the common law system one judgment is enough to create 
a precedent. In the civil law system, the giurisprudenza arises from a group of past 
judgments with the same constant regula juris.  
Clearly, as the number of judgments to be taken into account as to extract the 
giurisprudenza is higher, this is hard work because judgments, even of the Court of 
Cassation itself, are often in contradiction one another and it is not so easy to understand 
when a giurisprudenza is costante, i.e. with the same constant underpinning regula juris. 
Taruffo calls this caos giurisprudenziale (chaotic jurisprudence)
35
.  
At the end of the day, due to these dimensions, it is clear that the persuasive strength of 
precedents of the Corte di cassazione in the Italian legal system is rather weak.  
 
3.3. The Express Recognitions of the Persuasive Role of the Precedent of the Corte di 
cassazione (with regards to some Specific Circumstances) by Some Pieces of 
Legislation 
 
                                                          
33
 Ibidem, p. 237 ff. and ID., Precedente e giurisprudenza, cit., p. 713 ff. 
34
 See M. TARUFFO, Dimensioni del precedente giudiziario, cit., p. 421 ff. and also ID., Precedente e 
giurisprudenza, cit., p. 712 ff.  
35
 See M. TARUFFO, Dimensioni del precedente giudiziario, cit., p. 425.  
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As said, from a legal perspective, it is worth seeing whether the role of the precedent in 
the Italian legal system is expressly recognised by any legislative provision with regards to 
some specific circumstances.   
Among others
36
, three provisions have been enacted by the legislature during the last 
twelve years. 
(i) First, article 374, subsection 3, codice di procedura civile (the code of the 
proceedings before civil courts), as amended in 2006.  
This subsection reads as follows: if one of the chambers of the Corte di cassazione does 




The aim of this amendment was clearly to protect the unity of the giurisprudenza of the 
United Chambers of the Court of Cassation. However, no sanction has been set if the 




(ii) Secondly, article 360-bis, n. 1, codice di procedura civile (the code of the 
proceedings before civil courts), as amended in 2009.  
This new article reads as follows: a challenge before the Corte di cassazione against a 
judgment is inadmissible, when the decision on matters of law in that judgment is based on 
the giurisprudenza of the Corte di cassazione and the claimant does not introduce any 
element which could lead to an overruling of that giurisprudenza
39
.  
The aim of this amendment was clearly to ‘protect’ the unity of the giurisprudenza of 
the Court of Cassation. However, the giurisprudenza in our system is hard to identify, due 
to the way the three dimensions are shaped in the Italian legal systems, and this makes it 
hard for the Corte di cassazione itself to declare a challenge inadmissible on those grounds 
set out in article 360-bis, n. 1, codice di procedura civile
40
.  
                                                          
36
 For an overview see A. PIZZORUSSO, Delle fonti del diritto, cit., p. 717 ff. 
37
 ‘Se la sezione semplice ritiene di non condividere il principio di diritto enunciato dalle sezioni unite, 
rimette a queste ultime, con ordinanza motivata, la decisione del ricorso’. 
38
 See M. TARUFFO, Precedente e giurisprudenza, cit., p. 720.  
39
 ‘Il ricorso è inammissibile: 1) quando il provvedimento impugnato ha deciso le questioni di diritto in modo 
conforme alla giurisprudenza della Corte e l’esame dei motivi non offre elementi per confermare o mutare 
l’orientamento della stessa’. 
40
 See M. TARUFFO, La giurisprudenza tra casistica e uniformità, in L. Vacca (ed.), Casistica e 
giurisprudenza, Napoli, 2014, p. 37 f.  
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(iii) Thirdly, article 118, disposizioni di attuazione del codice di procedura civile (the 
implementing regulations to the code of the proceedings before civil courts), as amended in 
2009. 
This article reads as follows: the legal reasoning of a judgment of a lower court shall 
also refer to precedents
41
.  
The aim of this amendment was clearly to protect the unity of the giurisprudenza of the 
Court of Cassation and of other courts. However, this provision has led to some concerns
42
.  
At the end of the day, these three provisions have not recognized any legally binding 
nature of the precedent in the Italian legal order. However, with these three provisions the 
legislature has clearly tried to expressly recognise the (persuasive) role of precedents with 
regards to some specific circumstances. After all, as mentioned above, the Corte di 
cassazione in 2014
43
 stated that the safeguarding of the unity and the stability of the 
interpretation of the law is to be considered as a legal criterion of interpretation, especially 
after the amendment of article 374 c.p.c. in 2006 and of art. 360-bis c.p.c. in 2009.  
However, as the precedent in the Italian legal system is so difficult to identify, due to 
the three dimensions already analysed, its persuasive role is weak, also with regards to 
those circumstances set out in these provisions.  
 
4. The Use of Precedent Made by the Corte costituzionale 
 
The use of precedent made by the Corte di cassazione has been already studied in depth, 
especially by Michele Taruffo. Therefore, as already said, the main scope of this article is 
analysing the use of precedent made by the Italian Constitutional Court: on the one hand, it 
will be examined the role of precedent of the Corte costituzionale towards itself, as to test 
the grade of its effectiveness in the Italian legal order in the light of the dimensions set by 
Taruffo; on the other hand, the role of the precedent of two other courts (the Corte di 
cassazione and the European Court of Human Rights), as used by the Corte costituzionale 
itself in its judgments will be examined, as to see whether and to what extent the Corte 
costituzionale considers the precedent of these two courts.   
                                                          
41
 ‘La motivazione della sentenza […] consiste nella succinta esposizione […] delle ragioni giuridiche della 
decisione, anche con riferimento a precedenti conformi’. 
42
 See M. TARUFFO, Addio alla motivazione?, in Riv. Trim. Dir. Proc. Civ., 2014, p. 375 ff.  
43
 See Cass. civ., sez. un., 6 novembre 2014, n. 23675.  
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4.1. The Highly ‘Political’ Role of the Corte costituzionale and the Need for a Strict 
Legal Reasoning when it Overrules 
 
The general features already seen with regards to the precedent in the Italian legal 
system in general, can be found in the precedent of the Corte costituzionale.  
First, precedents of the Corte costituzionale are not considered to be sources of the law, 
as from this perspective the nature of the judgments of the Corte costituzionale does not 
differ from the judgments of the other courts
44
.  
Secondly, it is worth mentioning that also with regards to the Corte costituzionale the 
concept of ratio decidendi hardly fits.  
As already said, the ratio decidendi is the proposition of law concerning the material 
facts of the controversy, on which implicitly or expressly the court has framed their 
judgment. However, the judgments of the Corte costituzionale do not refer to material 
facts. As already said, they refer to the constitutionality of a piece of primary legislation 
and they are based on the oggetto, the parametro and the motivi.  All these elements are 
not material facts. Therefore, the concept of ratio decidendi in its strict meaning does not 
fit with the nature itself of the judgments of the Corte costituzionale
45
. Once again, strictly 
speaking, we can only speak of regula juris instead of ratio decidendi with regards to the 
Corte costituzionale.  
Thirdly, the giurisprudenza of the Corte costituzionale does not legally bind the Corte 
itself. The giurisprudenza is simply persuasive. It affects the legal reasoning governing its 
subsequent judgments (i.e. when the Corte costituzionale decides to deviate from its past 
precedent, it has to explain in depth the reasons why it does so) but only de facto.  
However, if we look at the dimensions set by Taruffo, the strength of the precedents of 
the Corte costituzionale towards itself is stronger than that of the Corte di cassazione.  
From the perspective of the ‘institutional dimension’, the existence of one single Court 
(the Corte costituzionale) and the existence of one single Chamber within this Court tasked 
with constitutional judicial review, avoids opposing precedents from different courts or 
chambers.  
                                                          
44
 See A. ANZON, Il valore del precedente nel giudizio sulle leggi, cit., p. 168 ff. Contra A. PIZZORUSSO, 
Delle fonti del diritto, cit., p. 728.  
45
 See among others A. ANZON, Il valore del precedente nel giudizio sulle leggi, cit., p. 130 ff.  
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From the perspective of the ‘objective dimension’ and of the ‘structural dimension’, the 
small number of judgments issued by the Corte costituzionale (around 300 judgments per 
year) and the small number of Judges in the Corte itself (15 Judges, appointed for 9 years) 
avoids potential contradictory precedents.  
All that said, one should bear in mind another important feature of the Corte 
costituzionale, perhaps even more crucial. For the Corte costituzionale there is always the 
risk of being seen as a kind of political actor, as the issues concerned are of the highest 
‘political’ nature (i.e. they concern the constitutionality of statutes and acts of the main 
constitutional bodies of the State). Therefore, any overruling by the Corte costituzionale 
might run the risk of being seen as a purely political choice.  
To avoid this, when the Corte costituzionale overrules its own giurisprudenza, its legal 
reasoning has to be even more strict than the legal reasoning of other courts, as to be 
legitimate in the eyes of the public opinion
46
.  
Once again, this is not a matter of a legally binding duty but something which is rooted 
in the moral authority of the Corte costituzionale which needs to be legitimised before the 
court of public opinion in a constitutional legal order.  
At the end of the day, as Alessandro Pizzorusso wrote, in the light of the 
aforementioned features of the Corte costituzionale, the effectiveness of its precedent from 




4.2. The Coexistence of a Supreme Court and a Constitutional Court in the Italian 
system (the Corte costituzionale and the Corte di cassazione) and the Issue of the diritto 
vivente: is the Corte costituzionale bound by it? 
 
As already observed, things are rather complicated from the perspective of the 
effectiveness of the precedent, when a Constitutional Court coexist with a Supreme Court 
in a legal order, like in Italy with the Corte costituzionale beside the Corte di cassazione.  
As already mentioned, the Corte di cassazione is tasked with scrutinising whether the 
judgments of the lower courts have been issued in compliance with legislation and in this 
way protecting the unity of the interpretation of the law in a legal order. In Italy the 
                                                          
46
 See A. PIZZORUSSO, Stare decisis e Corte costituzionale, cit., p. 56 and A. ANZON, Il valore del precedente 
nel giudizio sulle leggi, cit., p. 166.  
47
 See A. PIZZORUSSO, Stare decisis e Corte costituzionale, cit., p. 55 ff.  
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interpretation of a provision constantly given by most of the courts and especially based on 
the interpretation of the Corte di cassazione is called ‘diritto vivente’
48
: literally, it means 
the ‘living law’. 
On the other hand, as said, the Corte costituzionale is tasked with judging whether a 
piece of primary legislation is in compliance with the Constitution. 
Their tasks are different. The interpretation of the law is primarily allocated to the Corte 




From the perspective of the precedent which matters here, the issue which might arise is 
the following.  
A provision might be constantly interpreted by the courts in a way which becomes 
diritto vivente (let us call it: norm A). However, a lower court might believe that this 
provision, as interpreted with a different meaning (let us call it: norm B), is not in 
compliance with the Constitution and might challenge it before the Corte costituzionale. In 
this event, is the Corte costituzionale bound by the diritto vivente, i.e. by the norm A? 
Strictly speaking, the Corte costituzionale is not legally bound by the diritto vivente 
because, once again, precedents are not legally binding in our legal order, because the 
relation between Corte di cassazione and Corte costituzionale is not one of hierarchy and 
because their tasks are different. However, the diritto vivente affects the Corte 
costituzionale de facto.  
(i) Usually the Corte costituzionale interprets the provisions accordingly to the diritto 
vivente (norm A). This means that the Corte costituzionale usually rejects the challenge, 
gives a different interpretation of the provision and states that the lower court has 
misinterpreted that provision by giving a different interpretation (norm B). Such types of 
decision of the Corte costituzionale is called (decisione) interpretativa di rigetto correttiva. 
It literally means that the Corte costituzionale rejects the challenge (rigetto) and that its 
decision (decisione) is based on an interpretation of the provision (interpretativa) which 
has changed (correttiva) from B to A the meaning of the provision given by the lower 
court. On the other hand, it is very uncommon that the Corte costituzionale agrees with the 
                                                          
48
 See E. MALFATTI-S. PANIZZA-R. ROMBOLI, Giustizia costituzionale, Torino, 2016, p. 339, G. 
ZAGREBELSKY-V. MARCENÒ, Giustizia costituzionale, Bologna, 2012, p. 368 ff. and A. RUGGERI-A. 
SPADARO, Lineamenti di giustizia costituzionale. Quinta edizione, Torino, 2009, p. 139 ff.  
49
 This has been noted by A. SPADARO, Limiti del giudizio costituzionale in via incidentale e ruolo dei 
giudici, Napoli, 1990, p. 19 ff.  
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lower court and declares the unconstitutionality of the provision, after interpreting it 
according to what the lower court has suggested (norm B).  
(ii) In the light of what has been said above about precedent in the Italian legal system, 
it is not so easy to say when the diritto vivente has been established.  
When no diritto vivente is made yet, the Corte costituzionale is freer.  
In this case the Corte costituzionale might agree with the lower court, interpret the 
provision in the way suggested by the court (norm B) and quash it as unconstitutional 
(decisione di annullamento: a judgment of annulment). 
On the contrary, the Corte costituzionale might interpret the provision in a way (norm 
A) which is in compliance with the Constitution. In such a case, the judgment would be a 
(decisione) interpretativa di rigetto adeguatrice. This means that the Corte costituzionale 
rejects the challenge (rigetto) and that the decision (decisione) is based on an interpretation 
of the provision (interpretativa) which has changed (adeguatrice) the meaning of the 
provision given by the lower court (norm B) in a way (norm A) that makes it compatible 
with the Constitution.  
Obviously, as no diritto vivente has been established yet, in the event of new cases, the 
final say on the meaning of the provision will always be up to the Corte di cassazione 
itself.   
At the end of the day, the diritto vivente is not seen as legally binding the Corte 
costituzionale. However, in the light of the techniques established by the Corte 
costituzionale (especially the decisione interpretativa di rigetto correttiva), the Corte itself 
has shown to be available to bow to the diritto vivente. Once again, as already said, 
controversies might arise (and arise frequently) when it is not clear what the diritto vivente 
is.  
 
4.3. The Corte costituzionale and the giurisprudenza consolidata of the European 
Court of Human Rights 
 
In his analysis of the precedent in the Italian system, Alessandro Pizzorusso noted that, 
according to the Corte costituzionale, the interpretation of EU law given by the European 
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Court of Justice legally binds the Italian courts
50
 (and the Corte costituzionale itself
51
). 
This is surely an example of a precedent (of a supranational Court) which is legally 
binding in the Italian legal order
52
.  
However, the Corte costituzionale carried out a more-in-depth analysis of the role of 
precedent (of an international Court) as such and its binding force only with regards to the 
precedent (better: the ‘giurisprudenza consolidata’) of the European Court of Human 
Rights.  
The Corte costituzionale has taken into account in its judgments the role of the 
‘giurisprudenza consolidata’ of the European Court of Human Rights since 2009.  
In order to understand this, it is worth saying a few words on the mechanism which is 
used by the Corte costituzionale to scrutinise whether a statute is in compliance with the 
European Convention on Human Rights.  
As already said, when the Corte costituzionale review the validity of a statute, it resorts 
to three main kind of standards (parametro). The norma interposta is one of these. 
The method to overcome a conflict between the European Convention on Human Rights 
and domestic law is the following, as stated by the Corte costituzionale in 2007
53
.  
First of all, every court shall try to interpret domestic legislation in accordance with the 
Convention, as it is interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights.  
However, if this is not possible, the court shall bring the case before the Corte 
costituzionale, having believed that domestic law is not in compliance with the domestic 
Act of Parliament which let the Convention come into force in the Italian legal system.   
This Act of Parliament is considered to be a so called norma interposta, as it is a piece 
of primary legislation which is strictly grounded on a Section of the Constitution (in this 
case: Section 117, subsection 1, of the Constitution). Under Section 117 legislative powers 
shall be vested in the State and the Regions in compliance with the Constitution and with 
the constraints deriving from EU legislation and international obligations. In fact, the 
Convention is an international obligation. Therefore, if an act of Parliament is not in 
compliance with the piece of primary legislation which let the European Convention on 
                                                          
50
 See Corte costituzionale, sentenza 30 ottobre 1975, n. 232, Corte costituzionale, sentenza 23 aprile 1985, n. 
113 and Corte costituzionale, sentenza 11 luglio 1989, n. 389. 
51
 See Corte costituzionale, ordinanza 15 aprile 2008, n. 103 and Corte costituzionale, ordinanza 18 luglio 
2013, n. 207.  
52
 See A. PIZZORUSSO, Delle fonti del diritto, cit., p. 714.  
53
 See Corte costituzionale, sentenza 24 ottobre 2007, n. 347.  
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Human Rights come into force in the Italian legal system, it is to be indirectly considered 
not in compliance with Section 117, subsection 1, of the Constitution itself, which 
established that legislative powers shall be in compliance with international obligations
54
.  
Compared to other international law treaties, the ECHR has the particular characteristic 
of having provided for the jurisdiction of a court, the European Court of Human Rights, 
which is charged with the role of interpreting the provisions of the Convention. Therefore, 
the final say on the interpretation of the European Convention on Human Right is on the 
European Court of Human Rights. Its eminently interpretative function assures that, after 
completing an interpretative comparison involving the community of interpreting bodies in 
as broad a manner as possible, a rule may be inferred from the Convention provision which 
is capable of guaranteeing legal certainty and uniformity amongst the states offering a 
minimum level of human rights protection
55
. 
The arguments set out above do not imply that the ECHR, as interpreted by the 
European Court of Human Rights, acquires the force of constitutional law and is therefore 
immune to assessments by the Corte costituzionale of its constitutional legitimacy. This 
means that the constitutional judicial review on it cannot be limited to the possible 
violation of fundamental principles and rights. It must extend to any contrast between 
interposed sources and the Constitution
56
. 
Coming now to the issue which more matters here (the ‘giurisprudenza consolidata’ of 
the European Court of Human Rights as taken into account by the Corte costituzionale), 
the Corte costituzionale stated in 2009
57
 (but pointed out in depth in 2015) that national 
courts are required (‘il giudice interno è tenuto’ and ‘il giudice italiano sarà vincolato’) to 
base their interpretation only on the ‘giurisprudenza consolidata’ resulting from the case 
law of the European Court. There is no obligation (‘nessun obbligo’) to do so in cases 
involving rulings that do not express a position that has not become final
58
. 
This conclusion, the Corte stated, is coherent with the organisation of the Strasbourg 
Court. The European Court of Human Rights is structured into sections, it allows 
dissenting opinions and it operates a mechanism capable of resolving contrasts within 
ECHR case law by referral to the Grand Chamber. The ECHR itself postulates the 
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 Ibidem, paragraph 3.3. and 4.5.  
55
 Ibidem, paragraph 4.6.  
56
 Ibidem, paragraph 4.7.  
57
 See Corte costituzionale, sentenza 26 novembre 2009, n. 311, paragraph 6.  
58
 See Corte costituzionale, sentenza 14 gennaio 2015, n. 49, paragraph 7.  
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progressive nature of the formation of case law, incentivising dialogue until the force of 
argument has resulted in a definitive choice in favour of one approach as opposed to 
another. Moreover, that perspective does not involve solely a dialectical relationship 
between the members of the Strasbourg Court, but by contrast – at least ideally – involves 
all courts required to apply the ECHR, including the Constitutional Court
59
. 
According to the Corte costituzionale, the notion of ‘giurisprudenza consolidata’ is 
recognised in Article 28 of the European Convention on Human Rights, under which the 
persuasive force of rulings is a matter of degree. This force can vary until ‘well-established 
case-law’ emerges
60
. According to the explanatory report to Article 8 of Protocol no. 14, 
which amended Article 28 ECHR: (a) this ‘normally means case-law which has been 
consistently applied by a Chamber’; (b) exceptionally, it is conceivable that a single 
judgment on a question of principle may constitute ‘well-established case-law’, 
particularly when that judgment is issued by the Great Chamber.  
Finally, the Corte costituzionale admitted that it is not always clear when the 
‘giurisprudenza consolidata’ has been established. However, it stated that there are, 
without doubt, signs: the creativity of the principle asserted compared to the traditional 
approach of European case law; the potential for points of distinction or even contrast from 
other rulings of the Strasbourg Court; the existence of dissenting opinions, especially if 
fuelled by robust arguments; the fact that the decision made originates from an ordinary 
division and has not been endorsed by the Grand Chamber; the fact that, in the case before 
it, the European court has not been able to assess the particular characteristics of the 
national legal system, and has extended to it criteria for assessment devised with reference 
to other member states which, in terms of those characteristics, by contrast prove to be 
little suited to Italy
61
. 
At the end of the day, according to the Corte costituzionale, the judgments of the 
European Court of Human Rights are recognised to be persuasive, until a well-established 
case law emerges. The Corte costituzionale expressly speaks of ‘persuasive force of 
rulings’ as a matter of degree
62
, until well-established case-law emerges. When a 
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‘giurisprudenza consolidata’ of the ECHR emerges, domestic courts are obliged
63
 to follow 
the interpretation of the Convention given by the European Court of Human Rights. 
In the light of the analysis carried out here, this statement of the Corte costituzionale 
can be considered as a relevant express recognition of the binding force of the 
‘giurisprudenza consolidata’ of the European Court of Human Rights in the Italian legal 
system. Moreover, the Corte costituzionale pointed out some signs in light of which the 
force of the rulings of the European Court of Human Rights can be considered legally 




One of the aims of this article was describing the express recognitions of the role of 
precedent in the Italian legal system by examining whether it is effective in the light of the 
dimensions of the precedent set by Michele Taruffo. In other words, one of the purposes of 
this article was to analyse, in the light of these dimensions, how effective precedent is in 
the Italian legal system, under the pieces of legislation and case-law which expressly 
recognise the role of precedent. 
As far as the precedent of the Corte di cassazione, the legislature has tried to expressly 
recognise the role of precedents with regards to some specific circumstances. However, as 
precedent in the Italian legal system is so difficult to identify, due to the dimensions 
analysed by Taruffo, its role is weak, also with regards to those circumstances set out in 
these provisions.  
As the use of precedent by the Corte di cassazione has been already studied in depth by 
Michele Taruffo, the main scope of the article was analysing the use of precedent by the 
Italian Constitutional Court.  
On the one hand, the Corte costituzionale’s approach to its own decisions has been 
examined, so as to test its effectiveness in the Italian legal order in the light of the 
dimensions set by Taruffo. As Alessandro Pizzorusso has already written, in the light of 
some features of the Corte costituzionale, the effectiveness of its precedent in the 
horizontal dimension is quite high. 
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On the other hand, the role of precedent of two other courts (the Corte di cassazione and 
the European Court of Human Rights), as used by the Corte costituzionale itself in its 
judgments, has been examined, so as to see whether and to what extent the Corte 
costituzionale considers the precedent of these two courts.  
As far as the precedent of the Corte di cassazione and the diritto vivente are concerned, 
this is not seen as legally binding upon the Corte costituzionale. However, in the light of 
the techniques established by the Corte costituzionale (especially the decisione 
interpretativa di rigetto correttiva), the Corte itself has shown to be available to bow de 
facto to the diritto vivente and the precedent of the Corte di cassazione. Controversies 
might arise (and arise frequently) when it is not clear what the diritto vivente is.  
As far as the precedent of the European Court of Human Rights, the Corte 
costituzionale has recognised since 2009 the role of the ‘giurisprudenza consolidata’ of the 
European Court of Human Rights in the Italian legal order. The Corte costituzionale has 
stated that when a ‘giurisprudenza consolidata’ emerges, domestic courts are obliged to 
follow the interpretation of the Convention given by the European Court of Human Rights. 
This seems to be an express recognition of the binding force of the ‘giurisprudenza 
consolidata’ (of the European Court of Human Rights) in the Italian legal order. Moreover, 
in 2015 the Corte costituzionale pointed out some signs in light of which the force of the 
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